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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

As early as 1799, courts began struggling with the problem of
allocating the risk of an injured party's loss between multiple defendants who were either associated with or responsible for the
damage sustained by the plaintiff.1 Initially, recognition was accorded the right of an individual defendant, legally responsible to
an injured party but not guilty of any fault or misconduct, to
recoup the entire loss from the party whose fault or wrongful
conduct precipitated the injury sustained by the plaintiff.2 The
* B.S., L.L.B., University of Texas; Partner, Fulbright and Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. Merryweather v. Nixan, 10 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). See generally Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged with Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12
HARV. L. REV. 176 (1898).
2. See generally Davis, Comparative Negligence, Comparative Contribution, and
Equal Protection in the Trial and Settlement of Multiple Defendant Product Cases, 10
IND. L. REv. 831 (1977); Dube, Contribution and Indemnity: Does the Right Exist Among
Joint Tortfeasors When One is Liable on a Theory of Strict Liability?, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 572
(1978); Comment, Comparative Causation, Indemnity and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 587 (1979).
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right of indemnity was succeeded in American jurisprudence by
the evolution of the rules of contribution.3 Contribution contemplated that joint tortfeasors in pari delicto be required to share in
the cost of the loss sustained by the plaintiff.4 Judicial development of these concepts of ascertaining and distributing losses sustained by injured parties, however, can only be described as inconsistent and uneven among the various jurisdictions.5
Most jurisdictions have adopted the concept of strict tort liability embodied in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.' With adoption of strict tort liability a struggle has emerged
3. The right of contribution among joint tortfeasors was established in 1917 by enactment of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971). This provision provides that:
Any person against whom, . . . a judgment is rendered in any suit, . . . or based
on tort, except in causes wherein the right of contribution or of indemnity, or of
recovery, over, by and between the defendants is given by statute or exists under
common law, shall upon payment of said judgment, have a right of action against his
co-defendant or co-defendants and recover from each a sum equal to the proportion
of all the defendants named in said judgment rendered to the whole amount of said
judgment.
Id.
4. See, e.g., Borg Warner Corp. v. White Motor Co., 344 F.2d 412, 415 (5th Cir.
1965)(applying Texas law); Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Bliss, 368 S.W.2d 594, 596-97 (Tex.
1963); Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 796-97 (Tex. 1962); Richards Mfg. Co. v. Aspromonte, 557 S.W.2d 543, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
5. Compare Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 303 N.E.2d 382, 386 (Ill. 1973) (contribution between joint tortfeasors does not exist in Illinois) and Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282
N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391-92 (1972) (loss allocated through comparative causation) and Austin Rd. Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 434-35, 216 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949) (right of
contribution does not abrogate common law indemnity) and Payne v. Bilco Co., 194 N.W.2d
641, 645-46 (Wis. 1972) (requirement of "special verdict" for contribution) with Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 388 (1978) (jurors possess
ability to fairly apportion liability between multiple parties) and B & B Auto Supply, Sand
Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Tex. 1980) (indemnity no longer applicable as between multiple negligent tortfeasors). See generally Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability
Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723 (1974).
6. See Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 325-26 (Alaska 1970); Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); Hiigel v. General
Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 987-88 (Colo. 1976); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 470 P.2d
240, 243 (Hawaii 1970); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 365 (Mo. 1969);
Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732, 735-36 (N.M. 1972); Webb v. Zorn, 220 A.2d 853, 854
(Pa. 1966); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. 1967). See generally
R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2d § 4:41 (Supp. 1980).
Thirty-four jurisdictions have adopted the law of strict tort liability, including: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
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as the courts attempt to distinguish, integrate, and/or accommodate the concept of strict liability in tort with the more traditional
doctrine of negligence and the application of contribution and indemnity between parties. Uncertainty exists whether the right of
contribution and/or indemnity should apply to joint tortfeasors
when one of the parties is adjudged liable based on negligent conduct, while another is adjudged liable on a strict tort liability
theory. For instance, should a tortfeasor guilty of negligent conduct causing injury to a party be permitted to recoup indemnity
from a co-defendant whose conduct is nonculpable, but who is likewise deemed liable for furnishing a defective product? Conversely,
should a party strictly liable in tort be permitted contribution
from a co-defendant tortfeasor who is neither a user of nor an innocent bystander with respect to the defective product, but who is
guilty of independent acts of negligence?
The Texas courts have wrestled interminably with the legal obligation and responsiblities that exist between tortfeasors characterized by varying degrees of culpability.8 It is readily apparent, however, that improvement is essential if the system is to provide a
fair allocation of the risk of loss among multiple parties contributing to an injury-producing event. This article endeavors to analyze
the changes initiated in Texas law regarding the problems of contribution and indemnity between a negligent tortfeasor and a party
deemed strictly liable in tort, and to suggest adoption of further
rules to insure a fairer and more evenhanded apportionment of the
risk of loss based on the fault precept underlying the entire tort
reparation system.

Oregon, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at 41.
7. Compare State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 406, 407 (Ariz.
App. 1974) (rejecting general right to contribution) and Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v.
Smith, 359 So. 2d 427, 428-29 (Fla. 1978) (refusing contribution from employer) and Suvada
v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Ill. 1965) (refusing contribution in strict liability
case) with Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1976) (construing
Mississippi law to allow contribution) and Busch v. Busch Constr. Co., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394
(Minn. 1977) (allowing contribution) and Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stromme, 479 P.2d
554, 557 (Wash. 1971) (allowing contribution in a strict liability case).
8. See, e.g., Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 528-30, 235 S.W.2d 609, 623-24
(1951) (breach of duty); Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 345-46, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1941)
(different degrees of care); San Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 271-72, 59 S.W.1109, 1111
(1900) (vicarious liability). An excellent review of the basis for determining the applicability
of indemnity is contained in Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 796-97 (Tex. 1962).
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CONTRIBUTION AND COMMON LAW INDEMNITY

As a necessary predicate for any analysis of the allocation of loss
among multiple liable parties, it is essential to clearly understand
the distinction between indemnity and contribution.9 Indemnity
involves essentially an all-or-nothing proposition. 10 This concept
contemplates a total shifting of ultimate responsibility to the party
legally responsible for the loss. The right of indemnification, as distinguished from contribution, depends not on legislative prerogative but rather on an evolution of the common-law concept of
implied contract." Contribution, unlike indemnity, is entirely a
creature of statute, and implies that parties in pari delicto share
12
the loss sustained by an injured party.
Fundamentally, the common - law right of indemnity encompasses three factual situations.'3 One concept of common-law indemnity involves different degrees of duty to the injured party. 4 A
9. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 310 (4th ed.
1971); Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IowA L.
REV. 517 (1952); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L.
REV. 150, 150-51 (1947); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U.
PA. L. REV. 130 (1932).
10. Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150,
151 (1947). Hodges characterizes indemnity as: "[Tihe payment of all of plaintiff's damages
by one tortfeasor to another tortfeasor who has paid it to the plaintiff." Id. at 151. Similarly,
the Texas Supreme Court in B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Central
Freight Lines, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1980), defined common law indemnity to entitle
one tortfeasor total reimbursement from another tortfeasor for damages paid to the plaintiff. Id. at 817.
11. As noted by the Texas Supreme Court in Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.
1962), "[alrticle 2212 has no application here if the situation is one where indemnity exists
under the common law." Id. at 797; accord, Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 525-30,
235 SW.2d 609, 621-23 (1951) (common law right of indemrity); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 185, 222 S.W.2d 995, 1002 (1949) (common law right of indemnity);
Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 344-45, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1941) (no right of contribution among joint tortfeasors at common law); see Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Kootz-Wagner Elec.
Co., 233 F.2d 380, 383 (7th Cir. 1956) (applying Indiana law); Southern Pac. Co. v. Morrison
Knudsen Co., 338 P.2d 665, 670-71 (Or. 1959).
12. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977); Austin Rd.
Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 434-35, 216 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949); Hodges, Contribution and
Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TExAs L. REV. 150, 151 (1947); Oldham & Maynard, Indemnity and Contribution Between Strictly Liable and Negligent Defendants in Major
Aircraft Litigation, 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 245, 247 (1977); Shelton, Comparative Causation:A
Legislative Proposalfor the Equitable Allocation of Loss Between Strictly Liable and Negligent Parties,20 S. TEx. L.J. 123, 124-25 (1979).
13. Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 798 (Tex. 1962).
14. See Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 345-46, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1941).
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second concept of indemnity envisions the tortfeasor being deemed
liable to the injured party vicariously by operation of law. 15 The
third concept contemplates a breach of duty that one tortfeasor
owed not only to the injured party but also to the co-tortfeasor.' 6
At common law, the various degrees of duty owed by each
tortfeasor is compared in apportioning loss. The degree of duty
concept involves a tortfeasor who seeks to obtain indemnity from a
co-tortfeasor because the indemnitee breached a duty to exercise
an appropriate level or degree of care, while the indemnitor
breached a duty to exercise a higher degree of care.'" As an example, a common carrier owes a high degree of care to its passengers,
while a party who collides with a common carrier and injures the
passenger merely owes a duty to exercise reasonable care. 8 Under
these circumstances, the party owing a duty to exercise reasonable
care to the injured party has breached a duty not only to the
injured passenger but also to the common carrier whose liability in
turn to the injured passenger is based on a more stringent
standard.'"
A second basis for common-law indemnity involves the vicarious
liability of the tortfeasor to the injured party by operation of law. 0

"[Wheeler] . . . involves the concept of 'different qualities' of negligence." Strakos v.
Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 798 (Tex. 1962).
15. See Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 797-98 (Tex. 1962); San Antonio v. Smith,
94 Tex. 266, 271-72, 59 S.W. 1109, 1111 (1900). "[Smith] . .. gives indemnity to the
tortfeasor who is only vicariously liable by operation of law." Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d
787, 798 (Tex. 1962). See also B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Central
Freight Lines, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Tex. 1980).
16. See Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 797-98 (Tex. 1962); Austin Rd. Co. v. Pope,
147 Tex. 430, 434-35, 216 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1949). "[Austin Road Co.] ... involves a breach
of duty as between tortfeasors." Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 798 (Tex. 1962).
17. Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 343-45, 153 S.W.2d 449, 450-51 (1941); see Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Tex. 1980).
18. Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 343, 153 S.W.2d 449, 450-51 (1941). In Wheeler, an
employee of Glazer drove a company owned truck into the path of a Dallas Railway Company street car, injuring Nona Wheeler, a passenger on the tram. Wheeler sued both Glazer
and the street car company to recover damages for the injuries she sustained. The court
held the street car company exercised ordinary care for the plaintiff's protection, but
Glazer's negligence was of a different quality from that of the street car company. Id. at 343,
153 S.W.2d at 450-51; see Huey v. Dykes, 82 So. 481, 482 (Ala. 1919) (qualities of negligence
as applied to a master and servant); Gregg v. Wilmington, 70 S.E. 1070, 1074 (N.C. 1911)
(master and servant).
19. Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 344-45, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1941).
20. San Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 271-72, 59 S.W. 1109, 1111 (1900); see Coastal
States Crude Gathering Co. v. Williams, 476 S.W. 2d 339, 350 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus
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For example, an employee who negligently injures another creates
liability not only for himself but also for his employer. Under principles of respondeat superior, both the employee and the employer
are jointly and severally liable to the injured party. As between the
employee and the employer, however, the culpable party is the employee who is obligated to indemnify his employer for the negligently caused injury.
Perhaps the single most important test for evaluating the propriety of common-law indemnity has been the breach of duty that one
tortfeasor owes to his co-tortfeasor.2 2 Texas courts have chosen to
conceptualize the breach of duty test as an "imaginary lawsuit" in
which the party seeking indemnity becomes a fictitious plaintiff in
a hypothetical action against the other tortfeasor. In the landmark
case of Austin Road Co. v. Pope,2" plaintiff was injured when a
truck operated by Pope backed into him, causing severe injury. 24
The general contractor, Austin Road Company, was responsible for
providing signals to operators of the dump trucks during the
course of backing.2 5 The jury concluded the operator of the truck
Christi 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Coastal States, the court described the category of indemnity characterized in Smith as being based on "active versus passive" negligence. The active
versus passive test originally contemplated a party who negligently created a dangerous condition, while another party was negligent in failing to recognize and remedy the condition.
In such situation the plaintiff was consequently injured by the joint negligence of the tortfeasors. Id. at 350. See Oats v. Dublin Nat'l Bank, 127 Tex. 2, 10-11, 90 S.W.2d 824, 829
(1936) (active v. passive test utilized); Valee v. Joiner, 44 S.W.2d 983, 984 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1921, holding approved) (active v. passive test upheld). But see Brown & Root, Inc. v.
United States, 198 F.2d 138, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1952) (court discussed disadvantage of the
passive v. active test but did not find indemnity applied). The Texas Supreme Court, in
General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977), rejected the active versus
passive negligence test as unsound. Id. at 860.
21. San Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 271-72, 59 S.W. 1109, 1111 (1900); Frantom v.
Neal, 426 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Knutson
v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. 1980).
22. See Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAs L.
REV. 150, 152-53 (1947). See generally Shelton, Comparative Causation: A Legislative Proposal for the Equitable Allocation of Loss Between Strictly Liable and Negligent Parties,
20 S. TEX. L.J. 123 (1979); Comment, Comparative Causation,Indemnity and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J.
587 (1979). As noted by the Texas Supreme Court in B & B Auto Supply v. Central Freight
Lines, Inc., "the right to indemnity usually arises when one tortfeasor has breached a duty
to a co-tortfeasor." B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines,
Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. 1980).
23. 147 Tex. 430, 216 S.W.2d 563 (1949).
24. Id. at 432-33, 216 S.W.2d at 564.
25. Id. at 432-33, 216 S.W.2d at 564. Pope and other truckers were hauling materials to
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was negligent in failing to maintain a proper lookout, and also
determined the general contractor failed to provide appropriate
signals to the truck operator during the back-up operation. 2
Although declaring both defendants to be in pari delicto, the Texas
Supreme Court differentiated the case from one where one tortfeasor breaches a duty to both the injured party and the cotortfeasor. Articulating the governing test, the supreme court
stated:
In order to determine whether the loss should be shifted from one
tortfeasor to another the proper approach is to consider the one
seeking indemnity as though he were a plaintiff suing the other in
tort, and then determine whether such a one as plaintiff, though
guilty of wrong against a third person, is nevertheless entitled to
recover against his co-tortfeasor 2 7
If a tortfeasor, in the imaginary or theoretical position of a
plaintiff would be entitled to assert a cause of action against the
co-tortfeasor as a defendant, then common-law indemnity is
appropriate.2 The Texas courts have repeatedly reaffirmed the
breach of duty test as the principal method for ascertaining the
existence of a right to common-law indemnity.2 9

a cement mixer operated by the Austin Road Company. This maneuver required Pope to
back his truck the length of a city block while other manual laborers worked on both sides
of the street. Although Austin Road Company endeavored to supervise the construction,
they neglected to provide a watchman to aid the truckers. Subsequently, Pope backed over
Jackson, a wheel barrow operator. Jackson sued Pope and Pope cross-claimed against Austin Road Company for failure to provide a watchman.
26. Id. at 434-35, 216 S.W.2d at 565-66.
27. Id. at 434-35, 216 S.W.2d at 565.
28. See Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1980). "Texas courts
apply an 'imaginary lawsuit' test in deciding whether one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity
from another." Id. at 1308; accord, Austin Rd. Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 434-35, 216 S.W.2d
563, 565 (1949); see, e.g., Vergott v. Deseret Pharmauceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12, 16.17 (5th
Cir. 1972) (applying Austin Road Co. "imaginary lawsuit" test); Borg Warner Corp. v. White
Motor Co., 344 F.2d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 1965) (citing Austin Road Co. as test); General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977) (citing Austin Road Co. as test); Air
Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574, 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(citing Austin Road Co. test); Butler v. Henry, 589 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (applying Austin Road Co. test); Gammage v. Weinberg, 355 S.W.2d
788, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Austin Road Co. test).
29. See, e.g., Harris v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 538 F.2d 682, 690 (5th Cir. 1976)
(applying Texas law); Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Bliss, 368 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. 1963); Butler v. Henry, 589 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see
General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977) (citing breach of duty
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Recently, however, this test for common-law indemnity has been
drastically altered by the Texas Supreme Court. In cases involving
multiple negligent tortfeasors under article 2212a, common-law indemnity no longer applies, while the right of common-law indemnity under article 2212 which governs multiple tort-feasors involving both negligence and strict tort liability remains an appropriate
and recognized remedy.30 In B & B Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking
Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc.,3" plaintiff was injured when a
Central Freight truck jackknifed on some clay negligently deposited on the highway by B & B Supply. The jury apportioned
662/3 % of the negligence to Central Freight and 33 1/3% to B & B
Supply. The Texas Supreme Court noted article 2212a was
designed to abolish the all or nothing concept that previously prevailed in negligence actions. The court announced, "[u]nder [article] 2212a, there is no longer any basis for requiring one tortfeasor
to indemnify another when both have been found
negligent ....

"32

Contribution, as distinguished from indemnity, did not exist at
common law.33 Prior to the advent of statutory authorization, a
test; noting it is not the sole factor). The long recognized right of common law indemnity in
cases involving multiple negligent tortfeasors has recently been abrogated in Balaban v.
New Terminal Warehouse Corp., 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 540, 541 (July 26, 1980). The supreme
court affirmed the intermediate appellate court interpretation that article 2212a abolished
the right of common law indemnity in cases involving multiple negligent tortfeasors. Id. at
541. Contemporaneously the Texas Supreme Court reversed the decision of the intermediate
appellate court in B & B Auto Supply Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., which had held
article 2212a did not affect common law indemnity in cases involving multiple negligent
tortfeasors. B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 603
S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex. 1980).
30. Compare Balaban v. New Terminal Warehouse Corp., 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 540, 541
(July 26, 1980) (abolishing indemnity) and B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v.
Central Freight Lines, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex. 1980) (between multiple negligent
tortfeasors the right of common law indemnity has now been abolished) with General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977) (recognizing indemnity) and Heil
Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(recognizing common law indemnity under article 2212 between negligent tortfeasor and strictly liable
tortfeasor). It may be significant that the Texas Supreme Court in B & B Auto Supply
declared that "[wie express no opinion whether this holding would extend to a strict liability case or a case involving a combination of negligent and strictly liable tortfeasors." B & B
Auto Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814, 818
(Tex. 1980).
31. 603 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1980).
32. Id. at 817.
33. See generally Hodges, Contributionand Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS
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tortfeasor was precluded from obtaining any contribution from a
joint tortfeasor 34 Each tortfeasor was deemed severally liable for
loss sustained by the injured party and could not anticipate contribution from other tortfeasors to satisfy the judgment. Due to the
obvious injustice, most jurisdictions have enacted a variety of contribution statutes to more equitably distribute and allocate the risk
of loss among all parties contributing to the injury-producing
event.35
III.

STRICT TORT LIABILITY AND THE PROBLEM OF CONTRIBUTION

AND INDEMNITY

Strict tort liability, contrary to the traditional concepts of negligence, imposes liability on a product supplier based on the condition of the product and not on the conduct of the product supplier.3 6 The conduct of the supplier is immaterial, and is not an
issue in a cause of action between the injured party and the prod37
uct supplier.
This distinction between negligence and strict tort liability was
emphasized by the Texas Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.38 Plaintiff was injured when he slipped and fell
from the step of a Caterpillar tractor designed to operate as a
front-end loader. The Texas Supreme Court ruled the degree of
care or fault of a product supplier is not an element of an action
instituted under strict tort liability. Rather, the condition of the
product is determinative of liability under section 402A. 3 ' An acL. REV. 150 (1947).

34. See Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 345, 153 S.W.2d 449, 451 (1941). The policy of
the law favored leaving wrongdoers where it found them. Id. at 451.
35. At least thirty-eight jurisdictions allow contribution. See Comment, Contribution
and The Distribution of Loss Among Tortfeasors, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 203, 207-08 (1975);
Comment, Comparative Contributionand Strict Tort Liability: A Proposed Reconciliation,
13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 889, 890 (1980).
36. The "product supplier" includes any manufacturer, assembler, wholesaler, or distributor of a product or component part. Seller has been liberally interpreted to include
within the ambit of its meaning any regular supplier of a product. See Rourke v. Garza, 530
S.W.2d 798-99 (Tex. 1975); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 790 n.3 (Tex.
1967).
37. E.g., Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 23 Tex Sup. Ct. J. 566, 570 (August 2,
1980); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex. 1979); Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. 1978).
38. 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978).
39. Id. at 870. In discussing the legal basis for strict tort liability as distinguished from
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tion based on negligence evaluates conduct, whereas strict tort liability focuses on the product as manufactured.
Unlike an action predicated on negligence, the injured party may
institute a cause of action against any party in the distributive
chain of the product.4 0 In instituting the suit against a defendant

based on strict tort liability, however, it is essential that the injured party establish the product supplier was regularly engaged in
introducing products into the stream of commerce.4 1
Prior to adoption of the doctrine of strict tort liability in
Texas, 2 it was well established that a negligent supplier of a defective product and a negligent third party who breached duties to
the injured plaintiff were considered joint tortfeasors. 3 Under such
circumstances, the doctrine of contribution, rather than commonlaw indemnity, controlled the liabilities of joint tortfeasors.

the traditional concept of negligence, the Texas Supreme Court stated:
The care taken by the supplier of a product in its preparation, manufacture or
sale, is not a consideration in strict liability; this is, however, the ultimate question in
a negligence action. Strict liability looks at the product itself and determines if it is
defective. Negligence looks at the acts of the manufacturer and determines if it exercises ordinary care in design and production.
Id. at 870.
40. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965). For a collection of cases, see generally J. SALES & J. PERDUE, THE LAW OF
STRICT TORT LIABILITY IN TEXAS 97 (1977).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). In instituting a suit against a party
based on strict tort liability it is essential that the injured party establish that: (1) the product was in a defective condition when it left control of the supplier; (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user; (3) the defect caused the injury; (4) the product reached the
injured party without substantial change. Id.. In Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urguidez, 570
S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1978), the court held that a product supplier who had not introduced a
product into the stream of commerce but was merely using the product in a test program
had not introduced the product into the stream of commerce to qualify as a seller under
section 402A of the Restatement. Id. at 375. The introduction of the product into the channels of commerce for use by the public is a prerequisite for strict tort liability. See Thate v.
Texas Pac. Ry. Co., 595 S.W.2d 591, 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
42. Texas formally adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) in 1967 in
the companion cases of Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales, Inc. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 785-86
(Tex. 1967) and McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967).
43. E.g., South Austin Drive-In Theater v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 948 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Union Iron & Metal Co. v. Gibson, 374 S.W.2d
458, 461-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. South Austin Drive-In Theater v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 948-49 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1967, writ ref d n.r.e.); see Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REv. 150, 151-52 (1947).
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One of the initial cases to consider multiple tortfeasors in the
context of a product related injury was South Austin Drive-In
Theatre v. Thomison." Plaintiff was injured when his leg was severed by the rotary blade of a riding power mower. The power
mower was manufactured by Gilson Brothers Company, and was
being operated by an employee of the South Austin Drive-In Theatre. ' 6 The jury found that Gilson Brothers failed to adequately
guard the mower's chain and rear sprocket, but also found the employee/operator was negligent in failing to maintain a proper lookout.47 The court refused to impose indemnity against the manufacturer of the mower and, instead, declared both parties to be in pari
delicto and, therefore, subject to contribution. 48 The court specifi-

cally noted there was no breach of duty, as measured by the test
articulated in Austin Road Co.. After applying the imaginary lawsuit test, the court observed that both defendants had breached a
duty to the plaintiff, however, neither had breached any duty owed
to the other.49
Texas adopted the concept of strict tort liability, as embodied in
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, in 1967.8 With
the advent of strict tort liability in Texas, the courts ostensibly
have continued to adhere to the basic rules of contribution and/or
45. 421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
46. Id. at 936.
47. Id. at 936.
48. Id. at 948-49.
49. Id. at 948-49. The court specifically noted:
We believe this duty does not meet the test of Austin Road Co. v. Pope.
We
fail to see in this record a breach by Gilson Bros. of any duty owing by it to Joseph
except the general duty owed Mike Thomison and all others lawfully in the vicinity of
the power mower while it was being operated. It appears to us that both Joseph and
Gilson Bros. owed a duty to exercise a care, one in the operation and the other in the
design of the power mower for the safety of Mike Thomison and all others in the
vicinity of the machine while it was being used as it was designed and intended to be
used. Both Joseph and Gilson Bros. breached their duty and each was guilty of the
same quality of negligence toward Mike ...
We believe that the negligence of Joseph, although constructive, but one upon
which the injured party may recover, places Joseph in pari delicto with Gilson Bros.
Since Joseph and Gilson Bros. were concurrent or joint tortfeasors, having no relation
to one another, each of them owing the same duty to Mike Thomison, and involved in
an accident in which the injury occurred without breach of duty to each other, no
right of indemnity exists on behalf of either against the other.
Id. at 948-49.
50. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. 1967); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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indemnity formulated under article 2212 and in South Austin
Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison.51 Although some jurisdictions have
concluded that a party strictly liable in tort and a negligent tortfeasor are not joint tortfeasors, rendering the doctrine of contribution inapplicable," the Texas Supreme Court has determined that
a product supplier, strictly liable in tort, is not more culpable than
a negligent third party." Third parties, therefore, in Texas, are
considered joint tortfeasors for the purpose of contribution, but
not under common-law indemnity.
In 1973, following adoption of strict tort liability in Texas, the
legislature enacted article 2212a providing for comparative negligence." The enactment of article 2212a neither overruled nor supplanted existing article 2212, which alluded to tortfeasors rather
than negligent parties.55 The courts construed article 2212a to be
applicable only in negligence actions, consequently, the comparative aspects of this statutory provision have been declared inapplicable between a negligent defendant and a strictly liable
defendant."
The landmark case confronting negligent and strictly liable in
tort defendants was General Motors Corp. v. Simmons.5 7 The
plaintiff was struck by a large truck owned by Feld Trucking and
operated by its employee. The employee ran a red traffic signal
colliding with the side of plaintiff's vehicle." The force of the impact caused the laminated glass in the driver's window to explode
51. 421 S.W.2d 933, 948-49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see General
Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977); Edgar, Products Liability in
Texas, 11 TEx. TECH L. REv. 23, 48-50 (1980); Comment, Comparative Causation,Indemnity, and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases,
10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 587, 590 (1979); 9 TEx. TECH L. REV. 701, 703-04 (1978).
52. See Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837-38 (Colo. 1976) (products liability does
not rest upon negligence principles).
53. In General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977), the supreme
court perceived, "no reason that a manufacturer found strictly liable under the lesser standards of proof of § 402A should be more culpable than the negligent manufacturer in
Thomison." Id. at 861.
54. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980). The comparative negligence statute was adopted by the Texas Legislature in 1973.
55. See, e.g., Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying
Texas law); General Motors Corp.. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977); Lubbock
Mfg. Co. v. Perez, 591 S.W.2d 907, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
56. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
57. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
58. Id. at 857.
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resulting in injury to the plaintiff's eyes. 59 After entering into a
"Mary Carter Agreement" 0 with Feld Trucking Company, the
plaintiff instituted a strict tort liability action against the manufacturer of his vehicle. 1 The plaintiff contended that under section
402A the laminated glass was a defective product that was unreasonably dangerous. 2 The supreme court concluded Feld Trucking Company had confessed negligence in the "Mary Carter Agreement" and, therefore, was a tortfeasor in the accident. 5 Articles
2212 and 2212a were reviewed and analyzed, with the court concluding article 2212a to be inapplicable in allocating the risk of loss
between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent defendant. 4
The court emphasized the inherent statutory weakness of article
2212a and suggested indirectly a solution to this type of situation.
The Simmons court noted article 2212a, "does not provide any
mechanism for comparing the causative fault or percentage causation of a strictly liable manufacturer with the negligent conduct of
a negligent co-defendant." 5 An additional suggestion was addressed to the legislature; that it investigate possible amendments
to articles 2212 and 2212a to alleviate the incongruous problem
created between an action involving only negligent tortfeasors and
an action involving a negligent tortfeasor and a strictly liable
tortfeasor."

59. Id. at 857.
60. Id. at 856-57. "Mary Carter Agreements" are named after Booth v. Mary Carter
Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8, 11 (Fla. App. 1967). The first case to recognize such an arrangement
arose when a settling defendant agreed to remain a party in the trial for the benefit of the
plaintiff and retain a financial interest in the plaintiff's recovery. Id. at 11. Simply stated, a
co-tortfeasor contractually agrees to aid the plaintiff in his suit against the remaining tortfeasor in consideration for recovering a portion of the plaintiff's judgment. Id. at 10-11.
Jurisdictions have adopted divergent positions on the legitimacy of such a practice. Compare Lume v. Stinnett, 488 P.2d 347, 351-52 (Nev. 1971) (Mary Carter agreement against
public policy) and Trampe v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 252 N.W. 675, 676-77 (Wis. 1934) (contractual settlement void) with Hemet Dodge v. Dryder, 534 P.2d 454, 460-61 (Ariz. 1975)
(Mary Carter settlement is not void) and Gatto v. Walgreen Drug Co., 337 N.E.2d 23, 28-29
(Ill. 1975) (Mary Carter agreement acceptable agreement).
61. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Tex. 1977).
62. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Tex. Civ. App. -Houston
[1st Dist.], rev'd, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
63. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977).
64. Id. at 861-62.
65. Id. at 862.
66. Texas House Bill Number 1161, presented before the Texas Legislature in 1979,
attempted to amend article 2212a of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated. It failed
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A corollary issue raised in the Simmons case involved the contention by Feld Trucking Company that having settled with the
plaintiff through the "Mary Carter Agreement" the manufacturer
was obligated to indemnify the trucking company for the sums
paid to the injured party. 7 Relying upon the earlier case of South
Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison,68 the supreme court declared that a negligent tortfeasor cannot claim indemnity from a
product supplier who is strictly liable in tort solely on the basis of
a different type of duty owed the plaintiff. 9 The supreme court
observed "no reason that a manufacturer found strictly liable
under the lesser standard of proof of section 402A should be more
culpable than the negligent manufacturer in Thomison.' 7 0 In essence, the Texas Supreme Court rejected Feld Trucking Company's claim for indemnity based on the breach of duty test originally announced in Austin Road Co. v. Pope.7 1 Moreover, as noted
under the facts in Simmons, Feld's position as a hypothetical
plaintiff was predicated upon a claim against General Motors for
the liability "incurred by the reason of Simmons' injuries. 7 2 Since
liability under section 402A is limited to property or physical damage caused by a defective product, the absence of a claim for other
than economic loss foreclosed a finding of indemnification.7 3

to pass, however, due to a lack of a quorum in the Senate.
67. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Tex. 1977).
68. 421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
69. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Tex. 1977).
70. Id. at 861.
71. Id. at 861.
72. Id. at 860. The Simmons court stated:
When we view Feld as plaintiff in an imagined suit against General Motors, we
have the Feld vehicle, driven by Johnston, run into the side of Simmons' car, causing
the defective General Motors' glass to scatter into slivers inside Simmons' car. Feld's
damage against General Motors would have to be the liability he incurred by reason
of Simmons' injuries. Feld's action would not be for any physical damages Feld,
Johnston or their property sustained; it would be only for the liability Simmons has
said they incurred. . . . We ground our decision upon § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. . . . Section 402A in our decision . . . [has] limited the seller's
liability to terms of the Restatement rule which is 'for physical harm thereby
caused. . . .' Feld and Johnston made no claim that they suffered physical harm. To
extend the duty to include liability to others would mean that in all causes the seller
or manufacturer is subjected to indemnity without regard to the independent torts of
others.
Id. at 860; accord, Nobility Homes v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. 1977).
73. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 860-61 (Tex. 1977).
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The breach of duty test has apparently retained validity in the
strict tort liability context. The Texas Supreme Court in Simmons
not only acknowledged the breach of duty test in the determination of whether indemnity or contribution applied between cotortfeasors, but added its imprimatur to this approach. 4 The court
observed the negligent operator of the truck was never in the chain
of ownership or possession of the alleged defective vehicle.7 Unless
a co-defendant is in the distributive chain, and actually subject to
section 402A, the product supplier owes no duty to that party, unless that party has received personal injury or property damage as
7
a result of the defective product. 6
In deciding Simmons the Texas Supreme Court considered the
earlier case of Heil Co. v. Grant.7 7 In Heil, the deceased was fatally
injured while repairing a dump truck owned by his brother. 8 The
bed of the truck had been raised by use of a hoist mechanism;
while the deceased was working beneath the bed of the truck, the
cable that controlled the hoist mechanism was inadvertently
triggered, causing the bed to crush the deceased.7 9 The manufacturer of the truck contended the owner was negligent in permitting
the deceased to work underneath the raised bed of the vehicle and
sought indemnity. The appellate court refused to sanction indemnity for the manfacturer and, in fact, concluded the owner-purchaser, even if negligent as to the deceased party, was entitled to
obtain indemnity from the manufacturer because the defective design of the hoist mechanism constituted a breach of the product

74. Id. at 860.
75. Id. at 860; see Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 1304, 1314 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Texas law). Foster acknowledges the Simmons rationale that a suit for indemnity must
be based on injury to the person' or property of the party seeking indemnity and must not
be based on payment of a judgment. Id. at 1314-15; accord, United Tractor Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 563 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ). Applying the Simmons
rationale, the court in United Tractor held that even the purchaser of a defective product
could not recover damages under strict liability if his only loss stemmed from liability to
others. Id. at 851.
76. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Tex. 1977); Heil Co. v.
Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
77. Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e,).
78. Id. at 919. The plaintiffs alleged that the pullout cable for lowering the truck bed
was defectively designed because it was easily triggered and was not accompanied by adequate warnings. Id. at 920.
79. See id. at 926.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2022], No. 2, Art. 3

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:323

supplier's duty both to the deceased and to the owner of the
truck.8 0

The decision in Heil does not appear to be in conflict with the
earlier decision in South Austin Drive-In.81 In applying the breach
of duty test in South Austin Drive-In, the court, in essence, determined that an independent act unconnected with the product
constituted negligence of the co-tortfeasor.8" Both parties were
deemed to be in pari delicto.
If the negligence of a joint tortfeasor does not independently
cause the accident but rather, the negligence of the tortfeasor
merely arises out of the use of a defective product supplied by a
strictly liable manufacturer, then the negligent third party is entitled to common-law indemnity.88 For example, if a manufacturer
supplies scaffold boards that are defective for failure to incorporate
safety cleats, and a co-defendant is adjudged negligent for failing
to discover the absence of the cleats prior to use of.,the scaffolding
by the plaintiff, then the act of the negligent defendant derives
from the defective product and entitles the tortfeasor to recoup
common-law indemnity from the manufacturer."
Conversely, if the acts of the negligent joint tortfeasor are independent of the product and do not arise from the product itself,
then the negligent tortfeasor is in pari delicto and contribution applies. As an example, a manufacturer supplies a press that is defective for failure to include non-removable safety guards and a codefendant is deemed negligent for removing the guards.80 The
negligent acts of the co-defendant are independent of and distinct
from the condition of the product as supplied by the manufacturer,
and the negligent tortfeasor is in pari delicto with the strictly
80. See id. at 926.
81. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 860-61 (Tex. 1977). Compare Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 926-27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) with South Austin Drive-In Theater v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 946-47 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
82. See Geneial Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Tex. 1977).
83. See Air Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574, 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
84. See United Tractor, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 563 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1978, no writ); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
85. See Ford Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549, 557-58, 562 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ). See generally Tromza v. Tecumseh Prod.
Co., 378 F.2d 601, 606 (3d Cir, 1967).
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liable manufacturer. Under these circumstances, contribution and
not common-law indemnity applies.
Several recent decisions have further elaborated on the contribution and indemnity dichotomy between a negligent and strictly
liable in tort defendant. In Fosterv. Ford Motor Co.," the plaintiff
was injured while operating a tractor manufactured by one of the
defendants. A bale of hay slid off a hayfork which had been attached to the tractor's front-end loader.8 7 The hayfork itself was
defective and unreasonably dangerous because it was incapable of
preventing a load of hay from falling upon the tractor operator
when the front-end loader was raised above a particular height.88
The manufacturer of the tractor filed a third party action against
the injured party's employer and the designer of the tractor's hayfork attachment. 89 The fifth circuit concluded the manufacturer of
the tractor was not entitled to indemnity from either the injured
party's employer or the designer of the hayfork since the third
party defendants, though owing a duty to the plaintiff, violated no
duty owed to the manufacturer.' 0 The fifth circuit relied on the
Simmons rationale in concluding that contribution and not common-law indemnity applied.1 After reviewing several earlier supreme court decisions, and in particular the Simmons decision, the
fifth circuit stated:
Crew contends that had he been required to pay a judgment to
Foster, he would have a right to indemnity against Ford, because
Ford breached his duty under § 402A of the Restatement to sell
Crew a nondefective tractor. On the basis of General Motors v. Simmons, supra 558 S.W.2d 855, we reject Crew's argument....
Similarly, in an imaginary strict liability suit brought by Crew
against Ford, the only item of damage would be the liability Crew
incurred by reason of Foster's injury. Crew sustained no personal
injury or property damage as a result of Ford's sale of the defective
tractor. Since Simmons forecloses recovery under § 402A where the
sole item of damage is liability to others, Crew's suit against Ford
86. 616 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Texas law).
87. Id. at 1307.
88. Id. at 1310. Although the hayfork was designed to lift hay bales only three to four

feet off the ground the court concluded it was reasonably foreseeable that the loader would
be lifted above the operator's head. Id. at 1310.
89. Id. at 1307.
90. Id. at 1308.
91. Id. at 1313.
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would fail."
The fifth circuit acknowledged that South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison was alleged to contradict Heil Co. v. Grant. In a
footnote discussion of the cases, the court of appeals indicated the
cases are clearly distinguishable and compatible. The court noted:
Further, the indemnitee's independent negligent conduct is the significant feature which distinguishes the Thomison case from the
Simmons court's characterization of the Heil case. 3
It is readily apparent the determination of whether contribution
or indemnity applies between a negligent tortfeasor and a strictly
liable party is dependent on several factors." First, the negligent
tortfeasor must be seeking recoupment of damages either for personal injury or property damage caused by a defective product.
Merely paying a judgment incurred because of negligence or seeking reimbursement for economic loss does not constitute a basis for
common-law indemnity. Secondly, the negligence of the cotortfeasor must be derivative of the defective product and must
not constitute an independent act unrelated to the product. For
example, a negligent act of a tortfeasor that would have caused the
injury producing event in the absence of a defective product precludes the right of indemnity. Conversely, the negligence of a cotortfeasor that would not have caused the injury-producing event
but for the defective product satisfies the prerequisites for a right
to common-law indemnity against the product supplier.
In the recent case of Bell Helicopter v. Bradshaw,9 5 the plaintiffs, passengers in a helicopter manufactured by Bell and operated
by Smith, were injured when the tail rotor of the helicopter failed
due to a fatigue fracture." The helicopter crashed seriously injuring the plaintiffs. The jury found the owner of the helicopter, Ingle, and the operator, Smith, were negligent, but also found that
Bell Helicopter was strictly liable in tort for a defective product.9 "
The court concluded the product supplier, under the breach of
92. Id. at 1313.
93. Id. at 1316.
94. See Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 797-99 (Tex. 1962); Hodges, Contribution
and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 150, 150-53 (1947).
95. 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ granted).
96. Id. at 526.
97. Id. at 534-35.
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duty test, owed a duty not only to the injured passengers, but also
to the operator and the owner of the helicopter, notwithstanding
that the operator and owner knew or should have known the helicopter tail rotor blade would fail if used beyond its specified useful
life.9' Concluding that neither the operator nor owner of the helicopter owed any duty to the product supplier, although they owed
a duty to the passengers, 9" the court determined that both the
operator and owner were entitled to full indemnity against Bell
Helicopter Company utilizing the rationale announced in Simmons. 10 0 The court observed:
We think that such result may be shocking, particularly in light of
the fact that it may be said that Smith and Ingle were far more
culpable regarding plaintiff's injury than was Bell. The Supreme
Court has, in General Motors Corp. v.Simmons, supra, urged the
legislature to study the statutes in this area with an eye toward remedial legislation. We agree.10 1
The attitude of the appellate court reflects judicial discontent
attributable primarily to the inapplicability of article 2212a to
situations involving a tortfeasor strictly liable in tort vis-a-vis a
tortfeasor adjudged to be negligent. 102 Article 2212a represented a
legislative effort to alleviate the all-or-nothing approach of its
predecessor, article 2212.108 There remains little justification for
the courts to reject application of article 2212a to a strictly liable
defendant simply because the article defines the tortfeasor's conduct in terms of negligence rather than the broader characterization of "tortfeasor." 10 4 It is also appropriate to observe that article
2212a, although utilizing the term "negligence" in reference to

98. Id. at 535.
99. Id. at 535.
100. Id. at 535.
101. Id. at 535.
102. Id. at 535. The Corpus Christi Court of Civil Appeals recognized the inequity
particularly when the pilot/owner, in the opinion of the court, was the culprit most responsible for the accident and the product supplier only peripherally involved. Yet, the court felt
constrained to grant the pilot/owner of the helicopter total indemnity against the product
supplier. The court, echoing the refrain of the supreme court in General Motors Corp. v.
Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 863 (Tex. 1977), invited the legislature to review article 2212a
toward making it applicable in a strict tort liability context.
103. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2212, 2212a (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1980); see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 8 (1974).
104. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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tortfeasors, does not expressly exclude the application of the statute to cases involving multiple parties in which one party is adjudged liable based on the doctrine of strict tort liability.'0 5 It is
important to note that strict tort liability is an ex delicto doctrine.
Although the concept differs in certain respects from traditional
negligence, both doctrines represent a form of tort reparation to
injured parties.' 0 1
Either the legislature or the judiciary needs to adopt measures
that will include the strictly liable tortfeasor within the ambit of
comparative fault or allocation of loss as prescribed by article
2212a. Such an approach would neither be strained nor unique
and, in fact, would undoubtedly further the intent of the legislature in the enactment of article 2212a to provide appropriate
means to allocate the risks of loss.
In General Motors Corp. v. Hebert,0 7 plaintiff instituted a suit
based on strict tort liability for death allegedly attributable to a
product defect. 0 8 The Texas Wrongful Death Statute, 10 9 which
represents the sole basis for recovery of damages for wrongful
death, specifically provides recovery for wrongful death "caused by
the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, unskillfulness or default
of another."' 1 0 The court concluded it would be an anomaly to permit recovery of damages for personal injury under strict tort liability but deny recovery of damages for wrongful death caused by a
defective product."' In view of the court's liberal construction of
the Texas Wrongful Death Statute to encompass strict tort liability, it is difficult to understand the supreme court's reluctance in
construing article 2212a, which more clearly defines the legislative
objective to allocate the risks of loss, to include the strictly liable

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 501 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
108. Id. at 951. The decedent's automobile while traveling at a speed between sixty and
seventy miles per hour suddenly veered right, crossed the outside lane, struck the shoulder
of the road, turned back towards the highway, and rolled over once fatally throwing the
driver out of the car. Plaintiffs alleged defective steering design and manufacture. Id. at 951.
109. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
110. Id. § 1.
111. General Motors Corp. v. Hebert, 501 S.W.2d 950, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). "It would be unjust to interpret articles 4671 and 4672 as
allowing, in products liability cases, a recovery for an injury but not for death." Id. at 959.
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tortfeasor.112
It is urged that adoption of comparative fault in strict tort liability actions neither vitiates nor impairs the original goals and objectives of the strict tort liability doctrine. The injured party under
strict tort liability continues to be relieved of the burden of establishing that the product supplier or any other person in the chain
of distribution was negligent in the manufacture, design, distribution, or marketing of the product.1 1 Moreover, the injured party is
relieved of the obligation to establish privity and is permitted a
significantly less onerous burden of proof to establish liability. Regarding the damage award to the plaintiff, comparative fault
merely provides that recovery will be reduced to the extent that
the plaintiffs sub par conduct contributed to his loss. 114 The cost
of compensating injured users of defective products, although reduced proportionately, remains on the product supplier who must
accept the imposition of liability as part of an enterprise liability
to be spread among the consuming public. 116 On the other hand,
the injured party's sub par conduct should not be rewarded with a
windfall, and to the extent the plaintiff's sub par conduct contributes to the injury-producing event and resulting loss, there exists
no valid policy reason that this loss be borne initially by the product supplier and, ultimately, by innocent (product) consumers. 16
The mechanism of comparative fault satisfies the equitable allo-

112. Compare TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671, 4672 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (wrongful death) with id. art. 2212a (comparative negligence).
113. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 790-91 (Tex. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see J. SALES & J. PERDUE, THE LAW OF STRICT TORT
LIABILITY IN TEXAS 3-4 (1977), also printed in 14 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1976-1977); Edgar, Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEx. TECH L. REv. 23, 25 (1980).
114. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 579 P.2d 441, 442, 147 Cal. Rptr. 550,
551 (1978); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899, 902, 146 Cal. Rptr.
182, 185 (1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1165-73, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
383-91 (1978). Daly contains an excellent discussion of the merits of comparative fault or
allocation of the risk of loss. Id. at 1165-73, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383-91. See generally Sales,
Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liability - Prelude to Comparative
Fault, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 729 (1980). For a general discussion of comparative fault in a
product liability context, see id. at 759-78.
115. See Wade, Product Liability and Plaintiff's Fault - The Uniform Comparative

Fault Act, 29

MERCER

L.

REV.

373, 379 (1978).

116. Id. at 388. Dean Wade observes that, "if the plaintiff has contributed to his own
injury by his culpable conduct, he ought not to be able to cast on the manufacturer (and
ultimately on all other users of the product, through price setting) the cost of that culpable
contribution to his injury." Id. at 388.
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cation of loss according to the fault of all parties contributing to
the injury-producing event while at the same time insuring evenhanded fairness to the product supplier who is not totally responsible for the injury sustained by the plaintiff. It is rather axiomatic, and has been affirmed by most jurisdictions, that a product
supplier was never meant to be metamorphosized into an insurer
against product-related accidents by the adoption of section 402A
117
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

IV.

THE EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT

By ONE OR MORE TORTFEASORS

In 1973, the Texas Legislature amended the law of contribution
embodied in article 2212 to include the concept of comparative
negligence. 11 8 With ratification and enactment of the comparative
negligence statute, article 2212a, Texas acknowledged the necessity
of allocating the risk of loss between negligent tortfeasors and an

injured party who contributed to his own injury."19 While article
2212a has benefited the injured party whose negligence is not
greater than the negligence of other parties contributing to the injury,120 the literal interpretation and limited application of this
statutory provision only to "negligence" actions12 1 has rendered
article 2212a more of a bane than a boon to the product supplier
adjudged strictly liable in tort. Nowhere is this dilemma more glar117. Texas courts have been extremely careful in emphasizing that the concept of strict
tort liability does not impose an insurer status on any product supplier. The concept of
defect necessarily implies an underlying tort principle. See Hagens v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576
F.2d 97, 104 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying Texas law); Simien v. S.S. Kresge Co., 566 F.2d 551,
557 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying Texas law); Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d
374, 376 (Tex. 1978); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 93 (Tex. 1974). See
generally Keeton, Products Liability - Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of
Defect, 41 TEXAs L. REV. 855 (1963); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.
L.J. 5 (1965).
118. See Txx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
119. See id.; Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, ComparativeNegligence: An Exercise in Applied
Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 655 (1974); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 1, 8 (1974).
120. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980). Texas, under article
2212a, follows a modified comparative negligence approach requiring the plaintiff to be adjudged less than 50% at fault. Id.; see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw.
L.J. 1, 8-10 (1974); Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal Injury Actions,
18 S. TEx. L.J. 217, 267 (1977).
121. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977); see Edgar,
Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEX. TECH L. REv. 23, 48 (1979); 9 TEx. TECH L. REV. 701,
703-04 (1978).
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ingly apparent than in the settlement of product liability causes of
22
action.1
Under comparative negligence, an injured party whose negligence does not exceed the combined negligence of the defendants
is authorized to recover a percentage of the total damages awarded
by the jury. 123 The approach in negligence actions, requires that
the claimant be less than 50% liable for his own injuries.12' Moreover, if the injury producing event involves multiple defendants,
each party's liability is limited to the percentage of negligence assessed against each in causing the accident and resulting injury.12 5
When more than one tortfeasor is joined in the cause of action, the
finder of fact actually performs two functions in allocating liability.
Initially, the plaintiff and defendants are considered as two parties
to determine whether the fault of the plaintiff exceeds the 50%
maximum allowable under article 2212a. 12 1 The fact finder then
apportions among the multiple defendants the percentage of negligence attributable to each in contributing to the accident and the
-resulting injury. 2 '
The comparative negligence statute specifically addresses settlement agreements between the plaintiff and joint tortfeasors."' The
statute provides that if a tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff prior
to suit, and the settling tortfeasor is subsequently determined to
be negligent, the nonsettling defendants are entitled to deduct that
sum from the total damages awarded by the jury represented by
the percentage of negligence assessed against the settling tortfeasor. 29 In the absence of a determination that the settling party

122. See Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. 1978); General
Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977).
123. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
124. Id. § 1.
125. Id. § 2(b).
126. See Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied
Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 657 (1974). See also Wisconsin Natural Gas v. Ford, Bacon &
Davis Constr., 291 N.W.2d 825, 832-33 (Wis. 1980). Under a similar contribution statute,
Wisconsin requires that in cases involving multiple defendants the culpable conduct of the
plaintiff is compared to the individual culpability of each defendant rather than the combined culpability of all defendants taken together. Id. at 832-33.
127. See Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An Exercise in Applied
Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655, 657 (1974).
128. TEx. REV: CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(d)-(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980); see Deal v.
Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
129. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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is a tortfeasor, and a percentage assessment of the negligence attributable to the settling tortfeasor, the nonsettling tortfeasors are
entitled only to an offset of the actual amount paid in settlement.
Depending on the likelihood that the settling party will be adjudged the major percentage of negligence, it appears appropriate that
the nonsettling defendants implead the settling party to obtain a
determination of the degree and percentage of fault attributable to
each settling party.13 0 It has been suggested, however, that a settling party should not be impleaded simply to determine whether
the settling party is guilty of negligence.1 3 1 The argument has been
advanced that impleading a settling tortfeasor represents an
empty, and needless, formalism, since the settling tortfeasor is not
a true party." 2
The Texas courts have rejected efforts to extend application of
article 2212a to products liability actions involving parties adjudged liable based on strict tort liability." By excluding application
of article 2212a from causes of action involving parties adjudged
liable based on strict tort liability and reverting to the original article 2212, the courts have limited the comparative fault doctrine
13
only to "civil suits based on negligence.""
In the landmark case of General Motors Corp. v. Simmons,13 5
the Texas Supreme Court considered the application of article
2212a to a cause of action involving strictly liable tortfeasors. " 6
The trial court determined the impleaded settling party was negligent and the jury determined the nonsettling product supplier was
liable based on strict tort liability.1 3 7 Concluding article 2212, and
not article 2212a, governed the apportionment of liability, the

130. Id. § 2(g); see Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 217, 269 (1977).
131. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 14 (1974).
132. Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
133. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977); Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519, 535 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ
granted); Edgar, Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 23, 48-50 (1979); Comment, Comparative Causation, Indemnity, and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint
Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 587, 590 (1979); 9 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 701, 703-04 (1978).
134. Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
135. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
136. Id. at 862.
137. Id. at 858.
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supreme court approved a literal interpretation of article 2212a,
and declared its provisions were inapplicable under circumstances
other than between negligent tortfeasors. 138
Application of article 2212 to settlements poses a unique problem for both the plaintiff and defendant in actions involving a
party adjudicated to be strictly liable in tort. The non-settling
defendant is obligated to obtain a judicial determination that the
settling party is a tortfeasor for purposes of seeking contribution
under article 2212, regardless of the degree of culpability of the
parties. Meanwhile, the plaintiff is confronted with the unenviable
prospect that in effectuating settlement with one or more potential
tortfeasors, recovery against the nonsettling product supplier may
be reduced pro rata. A plaintiff who settles with one potential
tortfeasor reduces the verdict against the nonsettling tortfeasors on
a pro rata basis.189
The pro rata rule was articulated in Palestine Contractors,Inc.
v. Perkins.140 The plaintiff settled with one tortfeasor for the sum
of $1.00 and subsequently obtained a judgment against the nonsettling tortfeasor for $26,500. The Texas Supreme Court concluded
that the settlement with one of two tortfeasors reduced the verdict
obtained by the plaintiff against the nonsettling tortfeasor by onehalf or the sum of $13,250.141 Application of the Palestine Contractors doctrine imposes a pro rata reduction based on the number of
settling tortfeasors to all nonsettling tortfeasors rather than a percentage reduction. 142 The rationale of Palestine Contractors under
article 2212 has been extended to actions predicated on strict tort
liability. In this context, when a party who settles with the plaintiff
is later determined to be in pari delicto with a product supplier
adjudicated to be strictly liable in tort, the settlement simply

138. Id. at 858.
139. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 773-74 (Tex. 1964). In this
case the Texas Supreme Court held if the plaintiff chooses to settle with one of several joint
tortfeasors, then the plaintiff shall have his recovery from the remaining tortfeasors reduced
on a pro rata basis. Id. at 773-74; see Note, Settlement with One Joint Tortfeasor Bars
Recovery Against Others of the Settling Tortfeasor's ProportionateShare of Damages, 19
Sw. L.J. 650, 653-56 (1965); Comment, ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors, 44 TEXAS L.
REv. 326, 335-36 (1965).
140. 386 S.W.2d 764, 772 (Tex. 1964).
141. Id. at 772.
142. Id. at 775.
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reduces the total judgment by one-half." 3
Implicit in an action seeking contribution against a settling
party under article 2212 is the requirement of obtaining an adjudication that the settling party is, indeed, a tortfeasor. 14 This means
the nonsettling defendant most likely needs to implead all settling
parties into the lawsuit to determine whether the settling party
was negligent. 14 5 In Petco Corp. v. Plummer,141 plaintiff was injured by a gas explosion while attempting to activate the central
heating system in his home. 147 The plaintiff sued the Petco Corporation, Lone Star Gas Company, L & L Electric Company, and
Gene's Plumbing Company. Prior to trial, the plaintiff settled with
the electric company for $1,250, the plumbing company for $1,750,
and the gas company for $75,000.1"8 After the plaintiff dismissed
the settling parties from the lawsuit, Petco Corporation filed a
third-party action against the gas company seeking contribution or
indemnity. The jury awarded the plaintiff $165,959.14' After crediting the judgment with $3,000, which represented the sum previously paid by the electric company and the plumbing company, the
trial court entered judgment against the nonsettling defendant,
Petco Corporation, for one-half of the remaining amount or
$81,479.150 The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court judgment emphasing that under the Palestine Contractors doctrine,
143. Id. at 772; see Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Perez, 591 S.W.2d 907, 922-23 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Waco 1979, no writ).
144. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. 1977); Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 772 (Tex. 1964); Lubbock Mfg. Co. v.
Perez, 591 S.W.2d 907, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ). The failure to obtain an
adjudication that the settling party is a tortfeasor is fatal to a pro rata reduction of the
damage award. Lynn v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 453 F. Supp. 599, 602 (E.D. Tex.
1978).
145. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 1969)
(applying Texas law); Sweep v. Lear Jet Corp., 412 F.2d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying
Texas law); Leong v. Wright, 478 S.W.2d 839, 845-46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Connell v. Rosales, 419 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.- Texarkana
1967, no writ); Petco Corp. v. Plummer, 392 S.W.2d 163, 166-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 415 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same court that decided Petco declared under article
2212 the settling party need not be formally joined to adjudicate liability).
146. 392 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
147. Id. at 164.
148. Id. at 165.
149. Id. at 165.
150. Id. at 165.
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the award of damages is diminished only in proportion to the number of parties to the lawsuit adjudged to be tortfeasors."'
Failure to implead a settling party should not preclude the submission of issues to a jury to determine whether the settling party
was negligent. 5 2 Logically, the issues of the negligence of a settling party should be raised by defensive pleadings and submitted
to the jury. 5 Nevertheless, sufficient uncertainty exists that cautious counsel undoubtedly will continue to implead the settling
party to obtain an adjudication of negligence. 5 "
The adoption of article 2212a to allocate the risk of loss in negligence actions has not eliminated the necessity of obtaining an adjudication that the settling party is a tortfeasor. Even under article
2212a, the nonsettling defendant must elect either to take an offset
in the amount paid by the settling party, or obtain an adjudication
of the percentage of liability against the settling party. Unlike article 2212, a finding under article 2212a that the settling party is a
tortfeasor reduces the verdict by the percentage of negligence ad-

151. Id. at 166.
152. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 14 (1974).
153. In Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) the court stated:
Bringing in a third party against whom no relief can be granted in order to determine what relief should be granted as between the original parties is an empty formalism. Logically, the claim of proportionate reduction of damages can be raised by a
defensive plea to the effect that a third person, whose negligence had proximately
caused the damages, had made a settlement by which a proportionate part of the
damages were discharged. Yet cautious defense counsel have not been content with
this approach. Consequently, the extraordinary practice has persisted of filing thirdparty claims against parties who had settled, even though, under Palestine Contractors, no recovery could be awarded against them. These parties, because of their total
freedom from further liability, have rarely played an active part in the litigation.
Their presence has served only to present problems to trial judges with respect to
rights to premptory challenges and cross-examination of ostensibly adverse witnesses,
and to confuse injuries with respect to the true interests of the parties before them,
since these parties, though apparently in the position of defendants, often have made
provisions in their settlement agreements which aligned their interests with the plaintiffs, as Travelers has done in the present case.
Id. at 415. But see E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369, 375 (5th Cir.
1969). The fifth circuit interpreted Palestine Contractors and Petco to mandate impleading
the settling party. The court stated the test for obtaining a pro rata reduction:
(a) the settling tortfeasor must be party against whom indemnity or contribution is
sought at the time of trial;
(b) there must be a finding that the settling tortfeasor was negligent.
Id. at 375.
154. Id. at 416.
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judged against the settling party. 155 Article 2212, presently governing products liability actions, reduces the award of damages pro
rata based on the number of tortfeasors contributing to the accident and resulting injury.
V.

*THE CRASHWORTHINESS DOCTRINE AND THE PROBLEM OF
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY

In the area of products liability, the novel and innovative theory

of strict tort liability for crashworthiness or "second collision" has
emerged. 15" Most jurisdictions considering the issue have held that
a product supplier is obligated not only to design a product that
does not cause or contribute to cause the original accident but also
to design a product that will not aggravate or further enhance the
injuries produced in an original accident. 157 To impose such requirements on the design of a product creates potentially novel
problems in the area of contribution and indemnity.
It appears reasonably well established that an injured party

seeking recovery against a product supplier on the basis of
crashworthiness, as distinguished from a defective product that
causes or contributes to cause an accident, is obligated to establish
a divisible injury.158 This means, as a predicate for recovery, the
injured party must establish that but for the defective design of
the product a certain portion of the injury sustained in the acci155. Id. at 422.
156; See Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 963 (N.D. Tex. 1978); General
Motors Corp. v. Turner, 584 S.W.2d 844, 847-50 (Tex. 1979). See generally Digges, The
Impact of Liability for Enhanced Injury, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (1975); Hoenig & Goetz, A
Rational Approach to "Crashworthy" Automobiles: The Need For Judicial Responsibility,
6 Sw. U.L. REV. 1 (1974); Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design
of Passenger Cars, 69 HARv. L..REV. 836 (1956); Sales, Automobile Design Sufficiency and
Enhanced Injury, 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 388 (1971).
157. See Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1976); Huddel v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 266-67 (8th
Cir. 1976); Larson v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-02 (8th Cir. 1968); Jeng v.
Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); Stahl
v. Ford Motor Co., 381 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (Ill. App. 1978).
158. See Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 773 (5th Cir. 1976); Huddell v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 728 (3d Cir. 1976); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 264-65 (8th
Cir. 1976); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503-04 (8th Cir. 1968); Yetter v.
Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D.C. N.J. 1973). Contra, Smith v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors,
Inc., 556 F.2d 728, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1977). See generally Sales, Limitations on Recovery of
Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 18 S.TEx. L.J. 217 (1977). For a general discussion of
indivisible versus divisible injury, see id. at 261-65.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss2/3

28

Sales: Contribution and Indemnity between Negligent and Strictly Liable

19801

CONTRIBUTION & INDEMNITY

dent would not have occurred. 5 ' This requirement is fundamental
to a crashworthiness case, and the failure of the plaintiff to sustain
this burden of proof forecloses any liability against the products
supplier. 160 For example, in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Van
6 plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries when the train in
Zandt,"'
which he was a passenger collided with a freight car standing on a
siding.16 The evidence introduced at the trial raised a serious
question regarding the injury suffered by the plaintiff.'63 The
Texas Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff must submit a separate special issue when the occurrence of an injury is placed in
issue. The court reasoned that an issue must be formulated which
determines "whether there is any legal liability on a defendant to
pay the money damages .

.

. when the evidence is conflicting,

through the submission of separate issues."'"
This rationale possesses equal applicability in the crashworthiness context. The injured party has the burden of proving the alleged defective product was unreasonably dangerous and caused a
specified amount of injury. 65 This principle parallels the well es159. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976); accord, Higginbotham v. Ford
Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1976); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489
F.2d 1066, 1069 (4th Cir. 1974); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir.
1968); see Hoenig & Weiber, Automobile "Crashworthiness" An Untenable Doctrine, 20
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 578, 579 (1971); Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal
Injury Actions, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 217, 264 (1977). It seems clear the adequacy of design does
not arise as a relevant issue unless and until the plaintiff establishes that "but for" the
defective design and the failure to incorporate a different and safer design certain portions
of the injuries sustained in the accident would not have occurred. Huddell v. Levin, 537
F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976). Under earlier case law, however, some courts declared that a
manufacturer is not liable for "second-collision" injuries. See, e.g., Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311, 313 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (car ignited); General Motors Corp. v.
Howard, 244 So. 2d 726, 728 (Miss. 1971) (steering); Buchard v. Short, 275 N.E.2d 632, 63334 (Ohio 1971) (dashboard).
160. As noted by the fifth circuit in Higginbotham v. FordMotor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th
Cir. 1976), "the fact that Ford is liable only for the injuries over and above those that would
have occurred in a crashworthy car convinces us that a rational basis for apportionment
exists." Id. at 774; see Comment, Apportionment of Damages in The "Second Collision"
Case, 63 VA. L. REV. 475, 482 (1977). "[U]nder Higginbotham, apportionment is required
because defendants are not joint tortfeasors." Id. at 482.
161. 317 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1958).
162. Id. at 529.
163. Id. at 529. The petitioner railway produced evidence indicating, "the jar from the
collision was so slight that respondent could not have been thrown from his seat and could
not have been injured." Id. at 529.
164. Id. at 530.
165. Id. at 530. The Van Zandt court stated:
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tablished rule that a tortfeasor whose conduct merely aggravates
1 66
an existing injury is liable only to the extent of the aggravation.
This means the plaintiff must establish a divisible injury by demonstrating the difference between the injury received as a result of
the initial accident and any enhancement of the injury caused by
the alleged defective design of the product. As a parallel example,
when the plaintiff's original injury has been aggravated by the
improper treatment of a physician, the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the original tortfeasor damages for all injuries, includ67
ing those injuries which the malpractice aggravated or enhanced.1
The physician, on the other hand, is only liable for the injuries
enhanced by the malpractice. 1' 8 The doctor and the original negli-

The burden was on respondent to prove that he had been injured. That question was therefore put in issue by petitioner's general denial. We are satisfied that it
was also put in issue by petitioner's evidence, which need not be detailed. Inasmuch
as no separate issue on the fact of injury was submitted, the judgment in respondent's favor may not stand unless the question was fairly and adequately submitted
in Special Issue No. 5 quoted above.
Special Issue No. 5 is the conventional type of damage issue. Its purpose is not to
establish liability. Its purpose is to fix the amount of money damages which will fairly
compensate an injured party for his injuries and thus discharge the legal liability of a
defendant. Whether there is any legal liability on the part of a defendant to pay the
money damages must be determined, when the evidence is conflicting, through the
submission of separate issues.
Id. at 530 (emphasis added). See also Cowden Cab Co. v. Thomas, 425 S.W.2d 886, 888
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. See Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 18 S.
TEX. L.J. 217, 255 (1977). See generally J. SALES & J. PERDUE, THE LAW OF STRICT TORT
LIABILITY 137-40 (1977), also printed in 14 Hous. L. REV. 1, 137-40 (1977).
167. A negligent tortfeasor injures a plaintiff, who in turn is further injured by the
negligence of the treating physician. The original tortfeasor is liable for all injuries caused
by both his and the treating physician's negligence. E.g., Cannon v. Pearson, 383 S.W.2d
565, 567 (Tex. 1964); Potter v. Crump, 555 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Borden v. Sneed, 291 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1956,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord, Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So. 2d
702, 704 (Fla. 1980); Borowoski v. Von Solbrig, 328 N.E.2d 301, 305 (I1. 1975); Staehlin v.
Hochdoefer, 235 S.W. 1060, 1062 (Mo. 1921); Ruge v. Arden Hill Hosp., 371 N.Y.S.2d 354,
357 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Thompson v. Fox, 192 A. 107, 108-09 (Pa. 1937); Greene v. Waters, 49
N.W.2d 919, 921 (Wis. 1951).
168. The doctor can only be found liable for enhancement of the original injury. E.g.,
Gertz v. Campbell, 302 N.E.2d 40, 43 (Ill. 1973); Staehlin v. Hochdoefer, 235 S.W. 1060,
1062 (Mo. 1921); Radford-Shelton & Assoc. Dental Laboratory, Inc. v. St. Francis Hosp., 569
P.2d 506, 509 (Okla. App. 1977); Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal
Injury Actions, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 217, 265 (1977); see Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So. 2d 702, 704 (Fla. 1980); Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp., 187
N.W.2d 349. 352-53 (Wis. 1971).
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gent party are not deemed joint tortfeasors.
Unless the defective product actually caused or contributed to
the injury after the accident has occurred, there is no basis for obligating the product supplier to pay damages and impose the costs
of those damages on innocent consumers of the product.16 9 Basic
fairness dictates that a supplier of a product that does not cause or
contribute to cause an injury should not be held liable for those
damages.
The distinction between an indivisible and a divisible injury assumes critical importance under the concept of crashworthiness.
An indivisible injury is one which, by its nature, cannot be apportioned with any reasonable certainty to specific occurrences or to
individual wrongdoers.17 When apportionment of the injury is entirely arbitrary, speculative, and impractical, the injury is indivisible. When multiple joint tortfeasors each contribute to the injuryproducing event and the resulting injury is indivisible in nature,
each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable for all the damage."'
The acts of tortfeasors causing separate and distinct damages,
169. Several jurisdictions consider the product supplier a joint tortfeasor and, therefore, subject to the identical rules of contribution and indemnity that apply in situations
when the product causes or contributes to cause the original injury. See Fox v. Ford Motor
Co., 575 F.2d 774, 780 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Wyoming law); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593, 602-03 (E.D. N.Y. 1979). The majority of jurisdictions, however, hold that the injured party must establish a divisible injury as a predicate to maintaining a cause of action against a product supplier for a defective product. See Higginbotham
v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 773 (5th Cir. 1976); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d
Cir. 1976); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 264-65 (8th Cir. 1976); Larson v. General
Motors Corp;, 391 F.2d 495, 501-02 (8th Cir. 1968); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1355
(M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1979); Stahl v. Ford Motor Co., 381 N.E.2d
1211, 1214 (Ill. App. 1978). In the comment, Apportionment of Damages in The "Second
Collision" Case, the author is critical of Huddell and Higginbotham. The author notes, however, that in the interest of fairness, "the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving the
defectiveness of the automobile design, the availability of safer alternatives and the aggravation of injuries because of the defective design. Any lighter burden on the plaintiff would
transform the manufacturer into an insurer." Comment, Apportionment of Damages in the
"Second Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REV. 475, 486 (1977).
170. See Arnst v. Estes, 8 A.2d 201, 203-04 (Me. 1939); Anderson v. Minneapolis St. P.
& S.S.M. Ry., 179 N.W. 45, 48-49 (Minn. 1920); Haverly v. State Line & S.R.R., 19 A. 1013,
1013 (Pa. 1890); Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 256, 248
S.W.2d 731, 734 (1952); Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Walter, 277 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal
Injury Actions, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 217, 256 (1977).
171. Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 256, 248 S.W.2d 731,
734 (1952); accord, Borel v. Fibreboard Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1095 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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however, may not be characterized as imposing joint and several
liability. This concept applies when the injuries are divisible. Divisible injuries are those injuries which are capable of apportion17 2
ment as to wrongdoers and occurrence.
The landmark case involving the crashworthiness doctrine is
Larsen v. General Motors Corp.'78 The plaintiff was injured when
his vehicle collided head-on with another vehicle.' 7 The plaintiff
instituted suit against the manufacturer of the vehicle on the basis
that the design location of the steering shaft directly behind the
left front wheel was improper and produced more severe injuries in
a head-on collision than would have occurred if the steering column had been placed in a safer location. 175 The eighth circuit court
reversed a summary judgment for the product supplier holding the
doctrine of crashworthiness applicable. In adopting crashworthiness the court stated that a manufacturer should be held liable
only for the portion of damage or injury over and above the dam76
age or injury resulting from the original accident.'
In a recent well-reasoned opinion, the third circuit considered a
case in which plaintiff's husband was fatally injured when the
vehicle in which he was riding was struck from behind by another
vehicle travelling at a high rate of speed.'7 7 As a result of the impact, the deceased was thrown backward causing his head to strike

172. Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 256, 248 S.W.2d 731,
734 (1952). As stated by the Texas Supreme Court in Landers:
[W]here the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible
injury; that is, injury from which its nature cannot be apportioned with reasonable
certainty to the individual wrongdoers, all the wrongdoers will be held jointly and
severally liable for the entire damage and the injured party may proceed to judgment
against anyone separately or against all in one suit.
Id. at 256, 248 S.W.2d at 734.
173. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
174. Id. at 496-97.
175. Id. at 506.
176. Id. at 503. While adopting the concept of crashworthiness, the court further stated:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the manufacturer to
liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer should be liable for that portion
of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above the damage or
injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent
the defective design.
Id. at 503. Larsen excludes the possibility of holding the manufacturer jointly and severally
liable with the original tortfeasor for all of the damage. See Comment, Apportionment of
Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REV. 475, 478 (1977).
177. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 731-32 (3d Cir. 1976).
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the headrest of the vehicle. s He subsequently died as a result of a
fractured skull. 7 9 Plaintiff contended that death was proximately
caused by the defectively designed headrest and attempted to establish that a differently designed headrest would have prevented
the initial injury from being fatal. 8 ' The third circuit defined
plaintiff's burden of proof as being threefold: (1) in establishing
that the design was defective,, the plaintiff must offer proof of an
alternative, safer design that would be practicable under the circumstances; (2) plaintiff must offer proof of what injuries, if any,
would have resulted had the alternative, safer design, been used;
and (3) as a corollary to thi second aspect of proof, the plaintiff
must offer some method of establishing the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design.18 ' The majority of the
court concluded the plaintiff failed to establish a divisible injury
that would impose upon the manufacturer a burden to design a
different and safer headrest. The third circuit observed:
The crashworthy or second collision theory of liability is a
relatively new theory, its contours are not wholly mapped, but one
thing, at least, is clear: the automobile manufacturer is liable only
for the enhanced injury attributable to the defective product. This
being the essence of liability, we cannot agree that the burden of
proof on that issue can properly be placed on the defendant
manufacturer....
[Pilaintiff may not argue that the ultimate fact of death is divisible for purposes of establishing General Motors' liability and then
assert that it is indivisible in order
to deny to General Motors the
18 2
opportunity of limiting damages.

In a recent decision plaintiffs were injured when a car door
opened, permitting them to be ejected from their vehicle following
178. Id. at 732.
179. Id. at 732.

180. Id. at 735. The plaintiff alleged that the fatal headrest was designed like an airplane wing with an unyielding metal "v" shape pointed towards the back of the driver's
head. In comparison plaintiff offered a headrest which would distribute impact over a larger
area of the head. Id. at 735.
181. Id. at 737-38.
182. Id. at 738-39. As noted in the Comment, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REv. 475, 485 (1977), "Huddell thus reached a conclusion at
which Higginbotham had only hinted: the plaintiff bears the burden of apportioning damages in a second collision case." Id. at 485.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

33

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2022], No. 2, Art. 3

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:323

an initial collision.18 8 Relying on a earlier eighth circuit decision,
the third circuit emphasized that the product supplier is liable
only for those injuries that plaintiffs could establish were caused or
enhanced by a defective condition of the product after the initial
184
accident occurred.
Assuming that the plaintiff does establish a divisible injury in a
crashworthiness context, the concept of contribution and indemnity is substantially altered. Traditionally, the original negligent
tortfeasor causing the accident is responsible for all resultant injuries, including those injuries enhanced by the defective product.
The product supplier, on the other hand, is liable only for that
portion of the damages attributable to the design configuration of
the product that enhanced the injury after the accident-producing
event occurred.1 85 Under these circumstances, the negligent tortfeasor would have no right of indemnity against the product supplier for all of the injury suffered by the injured party. Rather, the
negligent tortfeasor would have a right of contribution against the
product supplier only for that portion of the damages attributable
to the defective design occurring after the accident-producing
event. 186 Apportionment is essential because the original negligent
tortfeasor and the product supplier are not joint tortfeasors under
1 87
the concept of crashworthiness.

183. Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (N.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d
Cir. 1979).
184. Polk v. Ford Motor Co,, 529 F.2d 259, 264-65 (8th Cir. 1976); Jeng v. Witters, 452
F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (N.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
185. See Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 268 (8th Cir. 1976); Schering v.
Gieseche, 589 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Ruge v.
Ardes Hill Hosp., 371 N.Y.S. 354, 356 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (subsequent doctor's malpractice aggravates injury).
186. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976); Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-02 (8th Cir. 1968). See also Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 383 F. Supp.
33, 37 (E.D. Wis. 1974), in which the court noted the corollary of this principle, that the
subsequent tortfeasor possesses no similar right of recoupment because the successive tortfeasor's liability is limited solely to the enhancement of the original injury caused by the
culpability of the subsequent tortfeasor. Id. at 37.
187. As noted by the eighth circuit in Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir.
1976), "Ford was not a joint tortfeasor in respect to any damages occurring prior to the fire;
it is only the enhanced injuries for which Ford may be liable in this case." Id. at 268.
Accord, Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 774 (5th Cir. 1976); Huddell v.
Levin. 537 F.2d 726. 735 (3d Cir. 1976).
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COMPARATIVE CAUSATION OR COMPARATIVE FAULT AS A
SUGGESTED SOLUTION

An emerging concept advanced by other jurisdictions to ameliorate the harshness of common law indemnity is comparative

fault.188 As practiced in its various forms the primary effect of
comparative fault, or as some jurisdictions label it, comparative
causation, is an assessment of liability based upon apportionment
of culpability for contributing to the injury-producing event. 189
The increasing popularity of the concept's application is attributable to the numerous conceptual inconsistencies inherent in common law indemnity. Whereas indemnity is often mechanically applied in situations when the indemnitee possesses a technical but
not an equitable right to restitutin,'9 0 comparative fault authorizes contribution among multiple defendants regardless of their
relative percentages of rectitude.1 9 ' Comparative fault or comparative causation further alleviates the necessity of applying the
numerous confusing tests which have evolved to facilitate indemnification. Comparative fault judges liability not by the courts extrajudicial application of artificial tests, but rather by a jury deter-

188. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 579 P.2d 411, 446-47, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555-56
(Cal. App. 1978); accord, Stueve v. American Honda Motor Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 752 (D.
Kan. 1978); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco Lycomine Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D.
Idaho 1967); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 91-92 (Fla. 1976); Dole v. Dow
Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391-92 (1972); Bielski v. Schulze, 114
N.W.2d 105, 107 (Wis. 1962). See generally Davis, Comparative Negligence, Comparative
Contribution, and Equal Protection in the Trial and Settlement of Multiple Defendant
Product Cases, 10 IND. L. REV. 831 (1977); Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in
Strict Tort Liability - Prelude to Comparative Fault, 11 TEX. TECH L. REV. 729 (1980);
Shelton, Comparative Causation: A Legislative Proposal for the Equitable Allocation of
Loss Between Strictly Liable and Negligent Parties, 20 S. TEX. L.J. 123 (1979).
189. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
386-87 (1978); Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 374 N.E.2d 455, 457 (II. 1978); Gus v. Nissan
Corp., 204 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Wis. 1973).
190. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 578 P.2d 899, 902, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 185 (1978); Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Minn. 1977);
Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Wis. 1962). See generally C. HEFT & C. HEFT,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL §§ 4.200-.220 (1971); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 12 (1978).
191. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391-92 (1972);
Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Product Liability
Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723, 736-38 (1974). See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE §§ 3.1-.5 (1974 & Supp. 1978).
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mination of the degree that each party contributed to the harm. 19'
The various jurisdictions that embrace comparative fault have
chosen to follow one of three approaches when confronted with apportioning fault between a negligent and a strictly liable tortfeasor.
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Florida have determined strict liability
to be a form of negligence per se within the contemplation of existing comparative negligence statutes. 193 As a second approach,
some jurisdictions have judicially declared that by enacting comparative negligence statutes to eliminate the harsh "all or nothing"
approach of contributory negligence, the legislatures did not intend to exclude strict liability from the operative ambit of such
statutes."" The third approach has involved judicial formulation of
comparative fault applicable in both strict tort and negligence liability cases.'9 5
The first approach, initiated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
holding in Dippel v. Sciano,'96 characterizes strict tort liability as
the equivalent of negligence per se and, therefore, extends the
applicability of the state's comparative negligence act to include
strict liability as another form of "negligence."' '

97

From its incep-

tion, Wisconsin courts have consistently applied comparative fault
to strict tort liability actions. 98 In Schuh v. Fox River Tractor
Co.,'

aa

plaintiff was injured while operating a crop blower.200 The

192. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 47
(Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
386-87 (1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972).
193. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976); Busch v. Busch
Constr. Co., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393-95 (Minn. 1977); Shuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 218
N.W.2d 279, 287 (Wis. 1974).
194. See Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 753 (D. Kan. 1978);
Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. Idaho 1967);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 142 (N.J. 1979).
195. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1976);
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384 (1978).
196. 155 N.W.2d 55 (Wis, 1967).
197. Id. at 63; accord, Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 219 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Wis.
1974); Shuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279, 287 (Wis. 1974).
198. See, e.g., Decker v. Fox River Tractor Co., 324 F. Supp. 1089, 1091 (E.D. Wis.
1971). The court rejected the Pennsylvania law barring contributory negligence and concluded that under the Wisconsin comparative negligence view plaintiff's negligence will preclude recovery if it is as great or greater than the fault of the defendant. Id. at 1091; see
Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 273 N.W.2d 233, 237-38 (Wis. 1979); Powers v. Hunt-Wesson
Foods, Inc., 219 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Wis. 1974).
199. 218 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1974).
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apparatus was designed to include a clutch lever to disengage the
auger which fed silage to the blower, but did not deactivate the
fan.2 1 In attempting to repair another component of the mechanism the plaintiff used the lever provided; he failed, however, to
disconnect the fan and suffered severe injury when his foot became
entangled with its blades.20 2 The manufacturer of the crop blower
embossed on the equipment a clear warning not to stand near the
area where the plaintiff sustained injury.2 03 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a verdict for the plaintiff and rendered judgment for the manufacturer, holding that the comparative negligence of the plaintiff, as a matter of law, exceeded the product
supplier's negligence per se.2 0
The second approach simply applies the jurisdiction's existing
comparative negligence statute irrespective of whether the cause of
action is premised on negligence or strict tort liability.2 0 5 Basically,
these jurisdictions conclude that enactment of comparative negligence statutes does not evidence a legislative intent to exclude
strict tort liability from the ambit of its application. For example,
in Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 20 6 plaintiff's husband
was fatally injured when a Honda motorcycle he was operating collided with an automobile. As a result of the impact, the motorcycle
ignited and burned the deceased. The court, predicting the course
of Kansas decisions, applied the Kansas comparative negligence
statute to an action based both on negligence and strict tort liability.2 07 The court stressed that application of the existing compara-

200. Id. at 281.
201. Id. at 281.
202. Id. at 281. Plaintiff stood on the edge of the hopper of the crop blower and attempted to free the chain of an attached conveyor belt. He slipped from the edge into the
revolving fan amputating his left leg. Id. at 281.
203. Id. at 281, 287. The plaintiff had operated the crop blower on previous occasions
and the evidence established he knew, or should have known, the fan was still running when
he pulled the clutch lever. Id. at 281. "The manufacturer saw fit to put a warning sign on
Id. at 287.
the machine to warn of the danger of standing on it.

204. Id. at 287.
205. Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 751-52 (D. Kan. 1978);
Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 602-03 (D. Idaho 1976);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 147 (N.J. 1979); see Kennedy v.
City of Sawyer, 608 P.2d 1379, 1386 (Kan. App. 1980). Contra, Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 609
P.2d 1382, 1384 (Wash. 1980).
206. 457 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1978).
207. Id. at 755-56.
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tive negligence statute to a section 402A cause of action harmonized the policies underlying enactment of a loss-allocation
statute.2 "
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart,2°9 a California decision,
epitomizes the third approach to the application of comparative
fault.2 10 In jurisdictions adopting the California approach, the
courts have reasoned that the introduction of a defective product
into the marketplace is a violation of a duty and, therefore,
manifests fault on the part of a products supplier.2 1 ' By characterizing strict liability as a form of culpable fault on the part of the
products supplier, the semantical necessity for "negligence" between the parties no longer forecloses use of comparative fault as a
form of contribution for the strictly liable tortfeasor2 2
In Safeway Stores plaintiff was injured in a Safeway supermarket when the shopping cart she was using collapsed, injuring her
foot. " Plaintiff instituted suit based on negligence and strict liability against Safeway, owner of the cart; Nest-Kart, manufacturer
of the cart; and a corporation that had in the past repaired some of
Safeway's shopping carts.2 4 The jury absolved both the plaintiff
and the repair facility of responsibility for the accident, but returned a verdict against Safeway and Nest-Kart based on both
208. Id. at 758.
209. 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
210. Id. at 445, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 554. See generally, Sales, Assumption of the Risk and
Misuse in Strict Liability-Prelude to Comparative Fault, 11 TEx. TECH L. REV. 729
(1980); Comment, Comparative Contribution and Strict Tort Liability: A Proposed Reconciliation, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 889 (1980).
211. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 889 (Alaska 1979); Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 579 P.2d 441, 445, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 554 (1978).
212. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386
(1978). "Fixed semantic consistency at this point is less important than the attainment of a
just and equitable result. The interweaving of concept in terminology in this area suggests a
judicial posture that is flexible rather than doctrinal." Id. at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386; see
Levine, Strict Products Liability and ComparativeNegligence: The Collision of Fault and
No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 351 (1977). "Some [authorities] have suggested that
products liability 'is not absolute but is based on the social fault of marketing defective
products,' and therefore it is logical and consistent to consider plaintiff's fault in relation to
the defendant's conduct." Id. at 351. See generally Brewster, Comparative Negligence in
Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR. L. CoM. 197 (1976).
213. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 579 P.2d 441, 442, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 551
(1978).
214. Id. at 442, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551. The jury indicated that the liability of Safeway
was for both negligence and strict liability, whereas Nest-Kart's liability rested soley in
strict liability. Id. at 442, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
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negligence and strict liability.2 15 The jury adjudged Safeway to be
80% at fault and Nest-Kart to be 20% at fault. 2 16 After judgment,
Safeway urged contribution between the defendants on a pro rata
fifty-fifty basis which was granted by the trial court.21 7 In reversing
the trial court, the California Supreme Court stated the difficulties
in apportioning fault to a cause brought under strict liability are
"more theoretical than practical 2 12
and past experience had
demonstrated that juries were competent in assessing percentage
causation between a negligent and a strictly liable tortfeasor "
In contrast to those jurisdictions which have judicially applied

comparative fault to strict liability are several states which have

provided for comparative fault by statute. 220 Arkansas' statute section 27-1763 includes a definition of comparative fault as "any act,
omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty or breach of
any legal duty which is the proximate cause of damages sustained
by any party. '2 2' In conjunction, Arkansas' recently legislated
products liability act provides that conduct by the consumer including abnormal use, unforeseeable alterations, improper mainte-

215. Id. at 442-43, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551-52.
216. Id. at 443, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 552. "The trial court, while indicating that 'common
sense' called for an apportionment of the judgment on a comparative fault basis ultimately
concluded that such comparative apportionment was not permissible in light of the existing
statutory contribution provisions." Id. at 443, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
217. Id. at 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555. Justice Tobriner in drafting the Safeway Stores
opinion gives an excellent review of the progression of California case law in support of the
decision. By reconciling the comparative negligence decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532
P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) with American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court,
574 P.2d 763, 143 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1978), which applied apportionment of liability among
multiple tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis, the cou'rt reasoned that apportionment
between negligent and strictly liable tortfeasors was an unassailably logical and necessary
extension of the earlier case law. Id. at 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
218. See Haney v. International Harvester Co., 201 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Minn. 1972);
Nobel v. Desco Shoe Corp., 343 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (App. Div. 1973); Franklin v. Badger Ford
Truck Sales, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 866, 871-73 (Wis. 1973); Gies v. Nissan Corp., 204 N.W.2d
519, 526-27 (Wis. 1973). But see West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 547 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir.
1977) (applying Florida law).
219. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
600.2949 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2252
(1975); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. § 1411 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80).
220. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Supp. 1977). Additionally, the following
states have enacted statutes which are not limited only to actions in "negligence": ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-6-2
(Supp. 1979).
221. 1979 ARK. ACTS 511, approved March 21, 1979.
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nance or use beyond the product's anticipated utility could also be
considered as factors in allocating fault.222
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA) offers yet another
approach to the application of comparative fault. The UCFA
addresses the broad concept of comparative fault in various actions. Under this uniform act, fault is defined to include any acts
or omissions that are negligent, as well as the defenses to a breach
of warranty, unreasonable assumption of the risk, misuse of a
product, and unreasonable failure to avoid injury.2 2 The Act
closely parallels the form of judicial comparative fault articulated
by the Supreme Courts of Alaska2 2 and California, 225 by compar-

ing the relative fault of the plaintiff and co-tortfeasors without regard to the theoretical underpinnings of the causes of action or
defenses.
Texas courts have on at least one occasion approached comparative fault. In General Motors v. Hopkins,220 the Texas Supreme
Court allocated fault between a strictly liable manufacturer of a
defective carburetor and an injured plaintiff who 'altered the car:
buretor upon reinstallation in the pickup truck.2 7 Although not

embracing the concept of comparative fault, the effect of the Hopkins decision was to establish a form for comparing the cause attributable to the defect with the fault attributable to the plaintiff's
misuse.2 2 Subsequently, the Texas Supreme Court in General Motors v. Simmons 229 noted the Texas comparative negligence statute
"does not provide any mechanism for comparing the causative
fault or percentage causation of a strictly liable manufacturer with
the negligent conduct of a negligent co-defendant." 23 0 The court

suggested the legislature consider amending the statute to elimi222. See Wade, Product Liability and Plaintiff's Fault - The Uniform Comparative
REV. 373, 374-78 (1978).
223. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1(a)-(b) (1977).
224. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 890 (Alaska 1979).
225. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 388
(1978).
226. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
227. Id. at 346.
228. Id. at 351. "Reduction of the plaintiff's recovery should be ordered where the misuse is a concurring proximate cause of the damaging event." Id. at 351.
229. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
230. Id. at 862.

Fault Act, 29 MERCER L.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss2/3

40

Sales: Contribution and Indemnity between Negligent and Strictly Liable

1980]

CONTRIBUTION & INDEMNITY

nate the perceived hiatus between article 2212 and article 2212a.2 31
Recently, in B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, and Trucking Co. v.
Central Freight Lines, Inc.," 2 Justice Spears indirectly alluded to
the possible consideration of the application of comparative fault
in Texas. 3 In deference to Simmons, which refused to apply article 2212a to strict liability,23 4 the B & B, Auto Supply decision
clearly states the court "express[es] no opinion whether [application of 2212a] would extend to a strict liability case."2" ' More recently, however, in Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey,3 6 three
concurring Justices express an urgent need to adopt comparative
fault in Texas. Justice Pope, in his concurring opinion observed
that, "[s]ooner or later, and the sooner the better, we must bring
product liability cases within a manageable format. Simplicity, order and consistency can be advanced. . . by (1) The elimination of
the misuse and voluntary assumption of the risk issues and by substituting in their place the more familiar issue about contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff . "2" The language
utilized in these recent decision appears to signal an increasing
momentum for an equitable and simple allocation of risk concept.
The next logical step, therefore, would be the extension of article
2212a to all tort actions, including strict tort liability.
The adoption of comparative fault in Texas would provide a
much needed degree of uniformity in allocating the risk of loss.
This, in turn, would directly affect the present entanglements that
cast such an ominous shadow over most settlement efforts. Currently, settlement between parties hinges upon whether the nonsettling tortfeasor is negligent or strictly liable.2 " If the cause of
action is brought in negligence then the allocation of the risk of
loss between settling and non-settling tortfeasors is expressly governed by sections (d) and (e) of article 2212a. If the liability of one

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 862.
603 S.W. 2d 814 (Tex. 1980).
Id. at 817.
Id. at 817.
Id. at 817.
23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 566, 571 (August 2, 1980).
Id. at 571.
See Edgar, Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEx.

TECH

L.

REV.

23, 48-49 (1980);

Sales, Limitations on Recovery of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 217,
267-69 (1977); Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies 10 ST. MARY's L.J. 75, 79-83 (1978).
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or more of the tortfeasors is predicated on strict tort liability, however, negotiations are subordinate to article 2212 and the Palestine
Contractors doctrine. The necessity of applying two totally dissimilar standards for settlement based solely upon the theory of liability favors form over substance. The court has emphasized that the
law encourages settlement, but the contemporary effects of settlement in a case involving a strictly liable tortfeasor dissuade negotiations. A plaintiff confronted with the effect of article 2212 and
Palestine Contractors is confronted with an undesirable dilemma.
It is ironic that almost all arguments that confronted proponents
of comparative negligence are now resurrected as a barrier to adoption of comparative fault.'" Jurists who argue that comparative
fault is arbitrary or "beyond the prowess of an American jury"24 0
ignore the success that has been achieved by comparative negligence. "What's good for the goose is good for the gander" is perhaps an appropriate syllogism for placing the entire problem in
proper perspective. A tort system, whether strict or otherwise,
must assume the appearance of fairness if its continued existence
is contemplated.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The current system in Texas for allocating loss between a negligent tortfeasor and a party strictly liable in tort is less than equitable. The Texas system fails to allocate the risk of loss other than
on a pro rata basis. As a consequence, a party deemed to be strictly
liable in tort assumes a disproportionate burden of the actual fault
and resulting damages. Although these damages are absorbed by
the supplier, ultimately innocent consumers pay the price of enterprise liability.
The present system is essentially an all-or-nothing system that

239. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1178, 144 Cal. Rptr., 380, 396
(1978) (Jefferson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div.
Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437, 445 (Wis. 1977) (Ward, C.J., dissenting). See generally
Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat From the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J.
467 (1976); Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of
Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 336 (1977); Comment, Comparative Contribution and Strict Tort Liability: A Proposed Reconciliation, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 889 (1980).
240. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437, 445 (Wis. 1977)
(Ward, C.J., dissenting); see General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex.
1977).
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does not contemplate an apportionment or allocation of loss. A system for determining liability on the basis of comparative fault is
essential. The Texas Supreme Court and intermediate appellate
courts recognize the inherent unfairness of the current system and
have invited the legislature to correct the condition.24 1 It is suggested that, like California2 42 and a number of other jurisdictions, 243 the Texas courts possess the prerogative to implement judicial comparative fault or comparative causation.2 44 Only this
system fairly allocates the risk of loss and insures that all parties
contributing to an accident-producing event pay a proportionate
share determined by their respective percentages of fault as assigned by the trier of the facts.2 "

241. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1977).
242. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1178, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 396
(1978); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 579 P.2d 441, 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (1978).
243. See Stueve v. American Honda Motor Co., 457 F. Supp. '740, 760 (D. Kan. 1978);
Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 602-03 (D. Idaho 1967);
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282
N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391-92 (1972); Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105, 107
(Wis. 1962).
244. The Texas Supreme Court has intimated that it may be reconsidering its earlier
rejection of the comparative fault concept in Simmons. The concurring opinion of Justice
Pope in Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 566, 571 (August 2, 1980)
and the language used by Justice Spears in B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, & Trucking Co.
v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Tex. 1980), may portend further
consideration of this concept.
245. Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liability-Prelude to
Comparative Fault, 11 Tax. TECH L. REv. 729, 777-78 (1980); Wade, Products Liability and
Plaintiff's Fault: The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373, 388 (1978).
The legislative intent to apportion the risk of loss on a comparative negligence rather than
aliquot basis by enactment of article 2212a is abundantly clear. See B & B Auto Supply,
Sand Pit, & Trucking Co. v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. 1980).
There exists no persuasive reason for excluding application of comparative negligence simply because the basis of an asserted cause of action involves the concept of strict tort liability. Id. at 816.
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